Sur l’agenda

février 2024

  • "LUTI (Land-Use/Transport Interaction) looks into the mirror : ready for decarbonization ?"

  • The seminar is online only

  • "Selling Checkmarks"
    Abstract : We study a social media platform that is monetized through selling “verified” status to content providers. Providers on the platform come in two types, ones that are valued by content consumers and ones that are not. Providers value attention from consumers ; (...)

    CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - A406

  • "Selling Checkmarks"
    Abstract : We study a social media platform that is monetized through selling “verified” status to content providers. Providers on the platform come in two types, ones that are valued by content consumers and ones that are not. Providers value attention from consumers ; (...)

    CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406

  • The seminar is online only

  • The seminar is online only

  • "Selective disclosure"
    Abstract : This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the common situation in which an interested party can voluntarily disclose informative but noisy evidence to a decision maker. Distinguishing whether the decision maker is fully rational or affected by an "all you see is what there is" updating bias, we investigate the non-obvious effects of the amount of disclosable evidence in terms of : i) the total number of pieces of evidence the interested party observes ; ii) the total number of pieces of evidence she can disclose among those she observes. Subjects in the role of the interested party disclose selectively, even if only imperfectly (i.e., some favorable evidence is withheld and some unfavorable evidence is disclosed), which limits the gains from deception and the costs of selection neglect. Subjects in the role of decision makers are systematically deceived only when the interested party observes more evidence than she can disclose. Consistent with the theory, a higher amount of disclosable evidence does not necessarily lead to higher information transmission, even though the welfare effects generally differ for rational and boundedly rational decision makers.

    CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - A406

  • "Selective disclosure"
    Abstract : This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the common situation in which an interested party can voluntarily disclose informative but noisy evidence to a decision maker. Distinguishing whether the decision maker is fully rational or affected by (...)

    CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406