"Impartial Observer with Ambiguity"
Abstract:This paper revisits the debate between Harsanyi and Rawls on collective decision-making with impartiality (Veil of Ignorance), focusing on how different levels of uncertainty influence the resulting social welfare functions. By incorporating (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Impartial Observer with Ambiguity"
Abstract:This paper revisits the debate between Harsanyi and Rawls on collective decision-making with impartiality (Veil of Ignorance), focusing on how different levels of uncertainty influence the resulting social welfare functions. By incorporating (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Quadratically Normalized Utilitarian Voting" Co-authored with Marcus Pivato
Abstract : What if a voter could declare how much they value alternatives rather than simply reporting their first preference or ranking the alternatives ? We propose a new voting mechanism in which voters (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Quadratically Normalized Utilitarian Voting" Co-authored with Marcus Pivato
Abstract : What if a voter could declare how much they value alternatives rather than simply reporting their first preference or ranking the alternatives ? We propose a new voting mechanism in which voters (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"How do migrants and natives search for jobs ?"
Abstract :
In this paper, we start by presenting new empirical facts on the job search behaviour of migrants. Using data from the largest online platform in Sweden, we find strong segregation between migrants and natives already at the (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"How do migrants and natives search for jobs ?"
Abstract :
In this paper, we start by presenting new empirical facts on the job search behaviour of migrants. Using data from the largest online platform in Sweden, we find strong segregation between migrants and natives already at the (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Children Costs in a One-Adult Household : Empirical Evidence from the UK."
Abstract : This paper addresses two critical questions for family and economic policy. Are estimates of the cost of children based on two-parent households generalizable to single-parent families ? Does the "two-child (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Children Costs in a One-Adult Household : Empirical Evidence from the UK."
Abstract : This paper addresses two critical questions for family and economic policy. Are estimates of the cost of children based on two-parent households generalizable to single-parent families ? Does the "two-child (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Machine predictions and human decisions with variation in payoffs and skill : the case of antibiotic prescribing"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"TBA"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
Paris IO Day
Monday, November 25, 2024
Venue : Maison.A Eduouard VII, 23, square Edouard VII 75009 Paris
Maison.A Eduouard VII
Maison.A Eduouard VII, 23, square Edouard VII 75009 Paris
Paris IO Day
Monday, November 25, 2024
Venue : Maison.A Eduouard VII, 23, square Edouard VII 75009 Paris
Maison.A Eduouard VII
Maison.A Eduouard VII, 23, square Edouard VII 75009 Paris
"Back to Black : The Median Voter Revisited"
Abstract : Pure strategy Nash equilibria involving two candidates almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two. In such cases, the majority core is empty. Assume that each candidate (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Back to Black : The Median Voter Revisited"
Abstract : Pure strategy Nash equilibria involving two candidates almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two. In such cases, the majority core is empty. Assume that each candidate (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Using principal stratification to analyze repeated treatment assignment” joint with Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek and Bas van der Klaauw
Abstract : Individuals who do not receive treatment in their initial assignment round, often have the option to reapply. The standard approach to (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Using principal stratification to analyze repeated treatment assignment” joint with Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek and Bas van der Klaauw
Abstract : Individuals who do not receive treatment in their initial assignment round, often have the option to reapply. The standard approach to (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Why are low-skilled not as compensated as expected for higher housing costs ?"
Abstract : Standard urban economics models tell us that wages, through agglomeration economies effects, are higher in large cities, but that the concentration of economic agents in these large cities increases (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Why are low-skilled not as compensated as expected for higher housing costs ?"
Abstract : Standard urban economics models tell us that wages, through agglomeration economies effects, are higher in large cities, but that the concentration of economic agents in these large cities increases (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"The Fragmentation Paradox : De-risking Trade and Global Safety"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"The Fragmentation Paradox : De-risking Trade and Global Safety"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
