"Quadratically Normalized Utilitarian Voting" co-authored with Marcus Pivato, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Abstract : We propose a new voting mechanism in which voters simultaneously report their von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions across multiple decision problems, each of (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - A406
"Quadratically Normalized Utilitarian Voting" co-authored with Marcus Pivato, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Abstract : We propose a new voting mechanism in which voters simultaneously report their von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions across multiple decision problems, each of (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Inference for Two-Stage Extremum Estimators "
with Abdoul Haki Maoude
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Inference for Two-Stage Extremum Estimators"
with Abdoul Haki Maoude
CY Cergy Paris University - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Core under prudent weighted Euclidean preference assumption"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle 406
"Core under prudent weighted Euclidean preference assumption"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Success and Failure of a Zero-Interest Green Loan program : Evidence from France" Ilya Eryzhenskiy, Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, Mariona Segú
Abstract : Zero-interest green loan programs (ZIGL) are gaining traction to address the tremendous financing needs implied by net-zero emission targets. We (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - A406
"Success and Failure of a Zero-Interest Green Loan program : Evidence from France" Ilya Eryzhenskiy, Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, Mariona Segú
Abstract : Zero-interest green loan programs (ZIGL) are gaining traction to address the tremendous financing needs implied by net-zero emission targets. We (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Non-Market Screening with Investment" with Victor Augias
Abstract :
We study how to screen agents who can make costly investments affecting their type, without monetary transfers. A principal commits to a screening mechanism that prescribes a probability of admission based on the agents’ (...)
CY Cergy Paris University - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Non-Market Screening with Investment"Retour ligne automatique" with Victor Augias
Abstract :
We study how to screen agents who can make costly investments affecting their type, without monetary transfers. A principal commits to a screening mechanism that prescribes a probability of admission (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Title : Recyclable goods, green consumption and incomplete information"
Abstract : Recycling can be viewed as an impure public good : firms produce private goods with different recyclability levels, and this helps to decrease the negative externality imposed by waste. However, when consumers (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle 406
"Recyclable goods, green consumption and incomplete information"
Abstract : Recycling can be viewed as an impure public good : firms produce private goods with different recyclability levels, and this helps to decrease the negative externality imposed by waste. However, when consumers are (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Redistribution and Unemployment Insurance"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle A406
"Redistribution and Unemployment Insurance"
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
The seminar is online only
The seminar is online only
