" Cheap talk with extreme states " (with Luke Zhao)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle 406
" Cheap talk with extreme states " (with Luke Zhao)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle 406
"Cheap talk with extreme states" (with Luke Zhao) "
CY Cergy Paris University - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - room A 406
"Informing to Divert Attention"
Abstract : We study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender’s signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, we characterise optimal (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Informing to Divert Attention"
Abstract : We study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender’s signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, we characterise optimal (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - A406
The seminar is online only
"Measuring the Skill-Biased effects of Automation on a Labor Market Continuum"
Abstract : We set up a search and matching model that features two skill types of workers and includes automation capital as an additional production factor. Automation capital is a perfect substitute for (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - Room A406
"Measuring the Skill-Biased effects of Automation on a Labor Market Continuum"
Abstract : We set up a search and matching model that features two skill types of workers and includes automation capital as an additional production factor. Automation capital is a perfect substitute for (...)
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - A406
" Home Bias in Procurement : Evidence from National and Subnational governments " with Manuel García-Santana
CY Cergy Paris University - Chênes 1 - 4th floor - room A 406
" Home Bias in Procurement : Evidence from National and Subnational governments " with Manuel García-Santana
CY Cergy Paris Université - Chênes 1 - 4ème étage - salle 406
""Selective disclosure""
Abstract : This project deals with the common situation in which a persuader observes multiple pieces of information (grades, ratings, test results..) and can select which ones to disclose. If the decision-maker does not (fully) take into account that disclosure by the (...)