Celik Gorkem

Professeur ESSEC
Membre permanent

Contact

Mail: celik@essec.fr
Page perso

Adresse:
ESSEC Business School - Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105
Cergy
France

Specialité

Théorie des Contrats, Economie de l’Information

Articles

  • Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism Celik Gorkem, Michael Peters , Games and economic behavior, 73/2 , p.375-387, 2012
  • Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation Celik Gorkem, O. Yilankaya , The b.e. journal of theoretical economics, Vol. 9 (Numéro 1), 2009
  • Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision Celik Gorkem, Journal of economic theory, Vol. 144 (Numéro 1), p. 69-95 , 2009
  • On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers Celik Gorkem, S. Sayan , Review of economic design, Vol. 12 (Numéro 3), p. 209-227 , 2008
  • Counter Marginalization of Information Rents : Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties Celik Gorkem, The b.e. journal of theoretical economics, Vol. 8 (Numéro 1 ), 2008
  • Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints Celik Gorkem, Games and economic behavior, Vol. 56 (Numéro 1), p. 37-44 , 2006

Documents de travail

  • Interested Experts : Do They Know More ? Celik Gorkem, The University of British Columbia, 2003